

33º Congreso
Internacional del CIRIEC
Valencia, 13 – 15 junio
de 2022

Nuevas dinámicas mundiales
en la era post-Covid; desafíos para
la economía pública, social
y cooperativa

Unemployed marginalised migrant women Work integrating social enterprises as a solution

Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall

*Center for Sustainability Research Stockholm School of
Economics Institute for Research*



Abstract

The chapter deals with low educated and language weak unemployed women migrants on the European labour market. For this group new creative solutions are needed. One such a solution is work integrating social enterprises (WISE), often run as social cooperative with democratic involvement and a hybrid business model related to both economic and social goals.

Leaning on new institutional theory, the chapter highlight Sweden, a Nordic welfare state where the public sector has catered for citizen employability but not promoted WISE as a legitimate partner. The chapter presents cases-studies of Swedish WISE and how these as institutional change agents cope with regulatory, financial and cultural hindrances. It is suggested that signs of a more resilient societal contract might rebalance the role of the public and private sector in favor of new models for work-integration like WISE.

Keywords: Migrant women, work integrating social enterprises, institutional change agent, labour policy.



1 Introduction

Jobs are one of the central pillars in the creation of a socially inclusive EU, where low unemployment goes hand in hand with citizens' democratic involvement in society (Hedin et al 2015). But challenges are multifold. European labour policy has since the 1970s and 1980s shifted from actively assuring the availability of employment for “everyone” (Spear et al 2001), to the individual’s responsibility for ensuring one's own employability (Peck, 1996; Rose ,1999). This has proven especially demanding for unemployed far away from the labour market.

Here we centerfold one such marginalized group - low educated and language weak migrant women. Besides the lack of basic skills, employers and labour agencies encounter a group with cultural and ethnical differences, socioeconomic poverty, and a general feeling of exclusion (OECD. 2018; Kraff & Jernsand, 2021). Job-creation for marginalized migrant women is a societal challenge with both multiple and contradictory analysis, a so called “wicked problem” (Churchman, 1967; Nicholls et al., 2015). In the post-pandemic recovery, expectations of more migrants and the Ukrainian refugee crisis, the risk is that this group remain uncatered for, with EU president Ursula von der Leyen failing the goal expressed in the Green new deal “where no one is left behind” (UN Finance for Development, 28 May 2020).

Sweden has been especially exposed to this wicked problem, having during the last thirty year seen a large influx of migrants. As a Nordic welfare state the public labour policy program expects high labour involvement. At the same time the Swedish labour market is structured both for highly skilled workers and have a large participation of women. Standardized labour programs have not worked for low educated and language weak migrant women (ex. Swedish Agency for Public Management, 2018).

One way to handle a complex challenge like this is to open the job-market for experimentation with new ideas. Among solutions are Work integrating social enterprises (WISE). Often structured as cooperatives WISE focus on democratic involvement (Pestoff ,2012; Pestoff & Hulgård, 2016). They belong to a new and growing category of European social enterprises with both economic and social goals, thus pursuing a hybrid business model (Defourny et al., 2014). These can be described as third sector actors, civil society or value -based organizations, that exist in parallel and collaboration with the private and public sectors (Stryjan, 2004; Nyssens, 2006). Research describes WISE as a viable tool related to empowerment, inclusion, and economic mobility for excluded and marginalized groups on the labour market (Lundgaard Andersen et al., 2016; Levander, 2016).

However, the support for WISE or other third sector social enterprises offering work integration has been limited (Defourny et al., 2014; Lundström & Wijkström, 1997). Research pictures public commitment as contradictory, unpredictable, and it varies across European countries (Nicholls et al., 2015; Social Europe, 2020). Sweden is often described as particular harsh institutional climate for WISE to work in (Gawell, 2016; 2019) and opening the employment market for private enterprises have failed the marginalized migrant women.



In this research we ask why WISE have not succeeded as an instrument for Swedish labour integration? Given continuous problems, one might at the same time argue that WISE should get another chance to show their capabilities? Perhaps the Ukrainian crisis, offers an opening?

The research is embedded in previous literature on social enterprises and WISE, public documentation of Swedish social enterprises, the Swedish institutional context as well as previous research conducted by the author. This is complemented with twenty-three semi-structured interviews, carried out during October 2021-January 2022, from municipalities (4) WISE (13), networks of WISE and social enterprises offering labour integration (3), public agencies (2), and academia (1). The WISE were chosen from a list of well-known WISE, which were then asked to name women-inclusive WISE that could be used here as illustrative cases.

To bring structure to our research we lean on new-institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott 2008). Literature describes how WISE-hybrid-model pursue activities that do not fit with regulations, norms, and expectations in society (Suchman, 1991; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Paches & Santos, 2012). To detect possible societal change we describe the circumstances that determines the conditions Swedish WISE must overcome in order to establish networks with other actors to be regarded as legitimate partners in the type of business they conduct (Furusten, 2013), here labour integration.

As shown, there are indications that a more resilient labour policy is emerging that opens new opportunities for both Swedish WISE and marginalized migrant women. Building on examples from seven WISE and network of WISEs¹ we find emerging support-structures in three areas: (i) public and private sectors' increased commitment to empower and promote inclusion of all (i.e. UN Development Goals 10.2); (ii) the development of collaborative networks with other WISE and (iii) the work to deploy resources to enable systematic use of social impact metrics. The Swedish experience can thus serve as an illustration of the ability for WISE to survive and adapt, despite a particular harsh climate for WISE's hybrid structure (Laurelii et al., 2014; Gawell, 2019).

The sections that follow start with a background (section 2) for the changing labour-market, the special situation for unemployed low skilled migrant women and the role WISE can play. Section 3 covers literature on WISE highlighting hindering forces. This is followed by the empirical work to show how WISE work (4) and a description of the institutional context. The last section 5 ends with a discussion and recommendations of policy changes to support WISE's work with labour integration of marginalized migrant women going forward.

2. Background

The labour market for the less skilled women

The average employment rate in Sweden is just under 80% (Statistics Sweden, Labour-market report 2019), including both full- and part time, a high level internationally.¹ The proportion of

¹ The Blue Way, The Yalla Staircase, One stair up, The Way-Out Coops, TingoKaka, Coompanion Värmland, Funkis



foreign-born women working is 63% (Swedish Agency for Public Management 2018), also a high level. OECD (2018) even singles out Sweden as a particular successful country in offering employment programs for refugee women.

The large participation of women in the labour force has at the same time revealed a wide gap between native and foreign-born people, where Sweden shows the largest gap in Europe. It is particularly wide between non-European-born women where 27% are out of the labour force, aged 16 to 64 (Swedish Agency for Public Management Statskontoret 2020). The corresponding for women born in Sweden is 16%. The statistics must at the same time be nuanced. In many countries, people who are far from the labour market, are missing from the labour statistics if he/she has been unemployed for a long time.

In 2021 there were 692 000 open unemployed in Sweden (SPES, 2020). Of these 130 000 were enrolled in programs targeting unemployed for a long period and in need of help to return to working life. Foreign born women accounted for 32% these (SPES 2020). SPES writes that women are underrepresented in programs, the outcome unclear and the offer, focusing mostly on standardized job searching activities, most likely not suitable for the target group.

The mentioned SPES-statistics (2020) reveals that the group of unemployed includes a large group of low-educated migrant women. According to the report, there were 118,000 low-educated foreign-born women, half of whom were born in countries in the Middle East and Africa. Almost half of the foreign-born women with primary education (up till 9th grade) were unemployed. Measures specifically targeting women are extremely rare (Nordic Council of Ministers/ Oxford research, 2018) and looking at the job market many women dominated jobs, such as in home-care, require higher education than male dominated jobs (SPES, 2019).

Civil servants at SPES estimate that approximately 10 000 of these are language weak and low educated migrant women in need of personal supervision.² These unemployed migrant women also encompass complex challenges. Large groups of women born in countries such as Somalia, Eritrea, Syria and Iraq, live in relative poverty (SPES, 2020).³ The problem is both structural and individual, covering the whole field from discrimination and the structure of parental insurance and social security system to weak language skills and ethnical heritage (Statskontoret, 2018). A report by OECD (2018) writes that many migrant women did not come to the host country for work, but as family reunification, and show a peak in fertility in the year after arrival. This is also a societal problem (SPES, 2020). Groups of foreign-born unemployed, on parental leave and single women with children live in relative poverty. Children of short-educated foreign-born mothers often live in socioeconomic vulnerable households. The group of older foreign-born women who are economically vulnerable is increasing. The problem is exacerbated by the Swedish housing policy with socioeconomic weak migrant-groups stuck in overcrowded and segregated suburbs, many with high criminality.

The overall conclusion from the reports is that targeted and differentiated interventions are needed for groups of foreign-born women in economic vulnerability.



What WISE are

The interest in WISE as an instrument for labour market policy took off the 1970s and 1980s. Sweden was hard hit by the cost-crisis at the times and just like other European countries had to tackle the growing challenge of a structural unemployment. In the 1990s Sweden, after having opened the domestic market for international trade and an EU membership in 1995, adapted the public labour policy to a more liberal market approach. The changes involved challenges. The public sector began to downsize, making it difficult for the public employment agency (SPES) to offer public sector job-opportunities for the low-educated and for other reason less equipped people. Also, Swedish industry's demand for low-educated workers diminished.

The solution included the set-up of sheltered workshops, run by regions and municipalities. However, the workshops became heavy criticized, especially from user-organizations in the 1970s (Hedin et al 2015). The workshops were merged into a state-owned company, Samhall in 1980, but the critique has remained (i.e. Dagens Arbete, 2021).

To address the challenges the 1980s and 1990s also saw the welcoming by non-traditional solutions (by Swedish standard), leaving room for civil society, religious institutions as well as non-profit foundations to contribute by combining work and care for the socially vulnerable, who would otherwise be disadvantaged in the labour market (Stryjan & Wijkström, 2001). One such solution was work integrating social enterprises, WISE (Arbetsintegrerande Sociala Företag, ASF).

WISE originated in Italy after World War II and have existed in Sweden since the late 1980s, when they were formed by staff and former patients in psychiatry and care. Today Swedish WISE reach youth unemployed, disabled, recent migrants and the group highlighted here, low-skilled and language weak women (Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth SAREG, 2019; Skoopi, 2021). Instead of offering subsidized jobs with limited supervision - as in the sheltered workshops - these cooperatives focus on workplace rehabilitation where the individual is prepared for the labour market by developing the individual's own capabilities, with the aim of strengthening competences, self-esteem and empowerment. The jobs are often simple, such as second-hand stores, cleaning, dog-walk, gardening, janitorial, but can also require some skills, such as lighter industrial subcontracting work, coffees and sewing.

The institutional context


As an analytical tool, the institutional complexity of the WISE organizational, societal and business goals is here visualized as two integrated flows of capabilities, joined together by the WISE (Illustration 1). The vertical flow illustrates the social goal – work integration and empowerment of marginalized women (or other groups). Public actors, like the employment agency (SPES) and municipality Social Service Center (Socialtjänsten), buy service such as work training or rehabilitation (Hedin, 2015). At the end of the vertical flow the outcome is illustrated as the target participant either having entered the outside labour market, gets a job at the WISE, start an apprentice program, studying or returns to unemployment. An outcome can also be that a person moves from being on social welfare to registered as unemployed.



The horizontal flow illustrates the business logic starting (left) with publicly procured pre-work introduction, as to develop work capability, work integration and training. Services like language training and supervision are bought, while the subsidized labour cost is tied to each participant. It is also common that WISE, and similar social enterprises, receive project-funding from organizations such as the European social fund. There is also a small, but growing, market for public-value-based partnerships, so called IOP (Idéburet offentligt partnerskap).

At the right end of the horizontal flow is the production of goods and services for the market, consisting of public sector, companies but also the retail segment. Philanthropic money is generally not used, as that market is limited in Sweden. However, it is common that the buyer contributes in-kind through offering subsidized rent for premises or equipment (shown in the left flow).

Illustration 1. The WISE business model



The WISE is situated in the middle. A rehabilitation program usually involves an individual plan with personal supervision of steps that take between six month and two years to complete. The seven WISE addressing marginalized women in this study use names such as “Value chains” (“Värdekedjor”) and “The step model” (“Trappstegsmodellen”). None of these methods are unique methods for work integration, it is the systematic approach that is unique.



There does not exist a complete list of the number of Swedish WISE, as there is no official definition of WISE or a legal form. However, in the middle of the 1990s there were around 45 social workers enterprises in Sweden and by 2000 these had grown to 90 (Laurelii, 2002). A list from 2012 mentions 271 WISE (Gawell, 2018). By 2016, the number had increased to 350 (SAREG, 2017). In 2018 the list covered 343 organizations, with 3,500 employed and another 9,500 people participating in activities (Gawell, 2018). By 2021 approximately 25 per cent of the WISE had closed,⁴ reflecting a reform of the SPES that limited demand for the WISE offering (Sjögren, 2021).

Furthermore, 65% of the registered social enterprises use the legal form economic association, the rest being non-profit association and foundations. Only a small part is with-profit companies (Gawell, 2018). Approximately 75% employ less than 10 people and only 1% employs more than 76 people. The share of people in employment with a foreign background in WISE is 29%, compared to 22% for employed persons with a foreign background on the ordinary labour market (Statistics Sweden, 2017; SAREG, 2021; Sjögren, 2021). A study of 75 civil society efforts for work inclusion, of which some constitute WISE, found that migrants made up 36% of the participants (Lindberg et al., 2022).

3. Wise in the literature

Theoretically social enterprises and social entrepreneurship can be characterized as institutional change agents (Defourny et al., 2014, Nicholls & Zeigler, 2019). WISE had since the 1970's been seen as strong innovators of Western economic welfare services (Bortzaga, 2011, Pestoff, 2012). They often develop collaborative processes (Sorensen & Torfing, 2015), are embedded in their local community (Stryjan, 2004; Medina Munro & Belanger, 2016), incorporate local opportunities and needs into their business model (Stryjan, 2004) and innovate in a way that blurs the boundaries between the three sectors: state, market, and civil society (see Lundgaard Andersen et al., 2016), thus challenging the current order.

Another distinctive feature of WISEs is the management's belief that the inclusion of participants attending their labour market integration activities in the overall operation of the enterprise results in transformed and empowered individuals (Pestoff & Hulgård, 2016). WISE also brings an improvement to the enterprise itself as the employees manage to produce a service or product that can be sold to the market (Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, 2010). In addition, WISE serve as an educational instrument for democratization and thus differs from Samhall, the state-controlled employer mentioned previously (Levander, 2016).

In general, the public sector in European countries views civil society and WISE as legitimate partner as they ensure that taxpayer funds directed towards work integration are spent for the benefit of citizens (Nicholls et al., 2015). Studies show that the step-wise methods used by WISE work for empowering marginalized migrant women on the labour-market (Lindbergh, 2018; Molnar & Havas, 2019; Rantisi & Leslie, 2021). They play a role in integrating language skills - and job-training (Kraff & Jernsand, 2021). Also, women that participate in a chain of activities run parallel produce more progression than the women participating in one activity at a time (Vaeksthuset, 2019).



There are also calculations of the societal value of Swedish WISE. A study using socioeconomic accounts show that 20 women in the social women cooperative Yalla Staircase generated SEK 80 million in saving for society over a 4-year period, the involvement and empowerment of the immigrant women not included (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2006).

Studies show that for social enterprises to prosper they rely on supportive ecosystem of regulation, financing, advisory but also national norms, the historical political context (Nicholls et al., 2015; Gawell; 2019) and collaborations among cooperatives (Laurelii; 2001; Nyssens, 2006). These legitimating forces vary across Europe, reflecting different systems of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) but have also shown to develop over time (Society Europe 2020).

In Sweden challenges – working as non-legitimizing forces- are manifested in short term public contracts (Edvik & Björk, 2016; Fred, 2018; Segnestam Larsson et al., 2019), bureaucracy that makes public organizations prefer efficient administration and generic large-scale solutions (Kraff & Jernesand, 2021) and lack of financing (Social Europe, 2020; Nachemson-Ekwall, 2021). To this can be added a market liberal approach to the EU public procurement rules that foster competition and financial austerity, resulting in the preference for large associations, small companies, and value-based enterprises opting-out for bidding on contracts (Gawell, 2019; Segnestan Larsson et al., 2019; Nachemson-Ekwall, 2021).

Also, Sweden lacks a legal form for social enterprises in general and WISE in particular (Gawell, 2019). This exists in many European countries (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008; Palmås, 2013). This hampers the ability to direct financial resources, manifested by a lack of a government sponsored social financial investment fund (SAERG, 2018; Nachemson-Ekwall, 2021).

There are also difficulties related to WISE itself. Its business structure is complex, with businesses in different fields, multifaceted management and heterogenous employees. Too many small-sized businesses, which can be good for empowerment, can make it difficult to maintain a sustainable business due to lack of scale (Hedin et al., 2015). To compensate for this WISE can share resources through developing collaborations through network and closer ties to the public and private sector. This, however, might challenge the role of WISE as a freestanding third part actor (Lindberg, 2021) and is especially formative as Sweden offers social enterprises limited access to philanthropic funding (Gawell, 2016).

WISE can also be criticized from an empowerment perspective. As described in Hedin et al (2015) the democratic dimension of the cooperative model of governance is often blurred. There might be a discrepancy of what management mean with inclusiveness and what is done. Many employees don't wish or are not able to get too involved. There might also be a trade-off between the degree of marginalization of the participants and the cost of the social enterprise (Molnar & Havas, 2019), were a quest for profitability lead to a focus on the less marginalized, resulting in a mission drift (Ebrahim et al., 2014).



In sum, the literature pictures Sweden as politically torn between being a classic Nordic welfare regime and a liberal market economy (Lundström & Wijkström., 1997; Pestoff & Hulgård, 2016). As argued here, this has prevented Sweden from developing a resilient public labour policy that can leverage on social enterprises, their hybrid organizations challenging the stable order (Defourny et al., 2014).

4. Cases and results

The empirical work includes examples of resilient public labour programs that have included WISE in the work with integration of marginalized migrant women. The Blue Way publicized socioeconomic accounts in 2008 showing savings of SEK 68 million, the participants fared better and 30% of the participants in job-training moved on to work, a high rate considering the target group.⁵ The Blue Way also documented the number of participants that got a job during the period 2011–2018, amounting to around 200/ year. Building on the same accounting-methodology, The Way-Out!-Cooperatives estimate to generate SEK 55 million in societal savings in 2020, both from lack of public expenditure and income (and tax) from work.

Representatives from two municipalities claim to have experienced both lower costs and higher outputs when collaborating and outsourcing work integration to WISE. The labour market unit at Nordanstig, a municipality in the Gävleborg region with 9,500 citizens, used to employ 5 supervisors in own premises, at a cost of a few million SEK. Now the labour market unit has partnership with four WISE employing 30 people at a total cost of half a million. There is no documentation of the outcome, but the labour unit head claims there are positive effects:

“When we ran the sheltered workshops inhouse it sometimes felt as if the workers were there for the supervisors and not the other way around. It happened that workers stayed to keep the supervisors busy. Now I can act more professionally.”

Head of labour unit at Nordanstig⁶

The labour market unit at Karlskoga, a municipality in the Värmland region with 30,000 inhabitants, used to employ 2,5 supervisors at a cost of SEK 2,5 million plus own premises and two cars. The labour market unit supported the development of a WISE, Funkis, that offers 25 jobs, mainly to migrant women. The cost is SEK one million. The municipality is expanding the work to a total of five WISE, with a total of 150 training places.⁷

These positive examples are, however, nuanced by interview-comments from the seven WISE and networks of WISE included in this study (Table 1). These highlight three institutional hindrances, here pictured as non-legitimizing forces, for WISE development related to work integration of marginalized migrant women. These are (Illustration 2): (1) the legal framework (2) access to finance and (3) labour politics.



Illustration 2. Hindering policy as non-legitimizing force

Hindrances	What
Legal	Government sets a general definition of social enterprise (2018) Market liberal approach to EU:s public procurement regulation Public Procurment regulation fail to implement § 77 related to reserved contract
Access to finance	Absence of public sponsored social investment fund(s) Reliance on project-financing No stable social financial infrastructure
Labour politics	Enhanced work-training (FAT, Förstärkt arbetsträning) General work training, “Support and Matching Service” (STOM and KROM) Jobb-training as part of rehabilitation.

Limitation - The legal framework

In 2018 the Government presented a strategy for social enterprises that included a new definition of social enterprises (Department of Enterprise 2 February 2018). It did not address WISE. It was more general, stating that the purpose of the business should be to solve a societal challenge, results measured primarily in socially beneficial goals and most profits reinvested in the business, or similar businesses.

This works to facilitate scalability (as the requirement for a democratic governance principle hinders this) and access to risk capital (thus limiting the need for a government-sponsored social investment fund). Also, broadening the requirement for reinvested profit opens for foundation ownership and faith-driven activities.

The definition had implication for WISE. Most public contracts in the welfare sector are open for competition, Sweden having adopted one of Europe’s most market liberal public procurement rules (Segnestam Larsson et al., 2019; Nachemson-Ekwall, 2021).

"When there is no clear distinction between social enterprises and with profit corporation, it is left to each individual municipality and region to develop its own definition. That's not realistic and many of them just open up all contract for competition."

Development manager Region Örebro

All interviewed WISE claim to have experienced difficulties in offering a whole chain of non-standard activities to municipalities or the employment agency SPES, as these were generally perceived as breaking public procurement rules. An example is the SPES offer from 2019 of Enhanced Labour Training (Förstärkt arbetsträning FAT).⁸ Language training or computer-proficiency is not to be seen as an integrated part of the program with the effect that WISE and



other civil society actors do not receive economic compensation for this work. Most WISE have opted out of FAT.

"After 2019, SPES no longer paid us for our efforts. After a site inspection we received a complaint because we had work consultants offering language training, as language training was not included among the 20 procured operations. We were asked to adapt our offer to the procured courses. But our target group, some are even analphabets, is not helped by a lecture of xx hours."

Development manager, The Blue Way

Furthermore, the EU public procurement directive (2014) addresses sheltered workshops (Article 20) and reserved contracts for certain social services, including work integration through social cooperatives (Article 77). In 2019 SPES introduced reserved contracts for work-integrating training positions (Arbetsintegrerande övningsplatser AÖP). Only Samhall and WISE can be eligible for this.⁹ It was appealed by the faith communities, that did not qualify as they did not offer work-integration in a separate entity and the overarching goal is "soul-searching and humanitarian work" (not work-integration). This further increased uncertainty for many public procurement officers.

Last, a government commissioned inquiry on the development for values-based not-for-profit organizations in health- and social service was presented in 2019. There "value-based actors" was defined in congruence with the 2018 definition of social enterprises, thus blurring the democratic role for social cooperatives further. It will be implemented January 2023.

Consequently, WISE have had difficulty both handling the private sectors' quest for a market liberal oriented approach to EU's public procurement directive and handling conflicting business rationale within the civil society community itself.



Table 1. Examples of WISE targeting marginalized migrant women

	The Blue Way	The Yalla Staircase	One stair up	The Way Out-coops	Tingokaka	Companion Värmland	Funkis
Target group	Mixture/ migrant women	Migrant women	Mixture/ migrant women	15 WISE/ some migrant women	Mixture/ migrant women	Migrant women	Mixture/ Migrant women
Business	worktraining, rehabilitation, cafés, bakery, sewing, recycling, gardening, cleaning, it-service	Café, catering, sewing studio, cleaning and conference service	3 cafés, dogwalk, moving-service gardening and carpentry, lighter subcontracting, lunchdelivery by bike	Rehabilitation, social activities. Cafés, restaurants, hotel, textile printing, recycling, art, gardening and carpentry	job- and language training, 2 cafés, botique and workshop. Followed Fairtrade	Restaurang and cafee	Cleaning, 4 restaurant, 6 caffees, flea-market, cleaning, medical transports, subcontracting, worktraining,
No of people	2021 only 150 employees in different programs. 450 (2020) and 650 (2019)+ 40 employees	50 employee+ +120 in rehabilitation, Malmö	13 members+50 employees, 7 migrant women	150+ 30 owners	30 at the most at 3 venues, now one is left as a church cafe (to be closed down)	7 Arabspeaking and 6 Somalis, many analfabets Today social service and SFI)	25 employeeed, 30 people in day-practice, in total 60 people
Location	municipalities in the Stockholm region	7 locations in Malmö region + 8 around Sweden	Falkenberg and Halmstad	Mainly region Westgotaland	Uppsala	Filipstad, Värmland	Karlskoga
Year of start	2007 (roots back to 1994)	2010 (project2006/ 08)	2012	As a EU-project 2002	As a EU-project 2001	2021	2007/ 2011 a WISE
Method	Workintegration through stepwise development	Step-model, supervisor were our women support newcommors	Steps based on a New York method/ FASA	based on an Italian method		Stepwise development	
Organizational structure	a number of WISE in collaboration	Network, also in Stockholm (Rinkeby) and Gothenburg (Hjälbo).	Singel WISE, Collaboration with Way Out!	Franchise, each cooperative is to small to manage by itself	a network of WISE	Single WISE	WISE started by municipality, now independent
Financing	Turnover: SEK 12 million (2020), SEK 24,3 million (2015). Part of the KROM-program	55% private, 45% public partnership Turnover: 16 mkr (2020)	Dependency on public financing.	Turnover: SE 40 million, 70% private, 30% public worktraining, 85% of income goes to wages	Had a IOP in Tierp. No financing as the Employment Agency demanded scale	2021-2024, Esf and municipality, after that 50% of income from privat sector	Turnover: SEK 6-7 million. Profitable (after 11 years)
Collaborations	Lost contact with Arbetsförmedlingen due to changes	IOP/ Business sector (ex. HM, Ikea, Midroc, Skanska, Rosengårds fastigheter, Gotain	IOP with Halmstad	Part of the FAT-program, collaborates with Social Trade, a platform for social business-offering	With the Church but no others		Network of 5 WISE. Turnover SEK 20 million, 50 employeeed and 150 in work training (before 170).
Achievements	2011–18/ 200 in training moved on to a jobs. Validated by Vaeksthuset and Socioeconomic accounts	From 6 employeeed 2010 to 50 today+ expansion to other places	40 persons in worktraining has gotten real jobs at 1Stair Up	Society gains SEK 55 million per year (2020) because the employees of earn their living and are paying tax.	Highly rated by the local Unions and Public Employment office	Start-up	The municipality's cost for social support reduced by 10%
Challenges	Dependancy on SPES. A cleaning business with 180 employees (Svenska Bostäder: Järvalyftet) closed following changed public procurement routines	KROM does not work, leveraging on the business relations	Dependency on public financing. To little compensation. The IOP offers payemnt after delivery giving a strain on cashflow	Depends on project financing, lack of scalable financing, Could invest SEK 5 million.	The Public Employment Agency changed procurement rules. Closed down. Independent cafes remained but experienced difficulty too	Long-term financing	Lacks a simple model for evaluating impact/ KPIs
Lessons learned	No scaleable financing, hard to match requirements from procurement rules of SPES	Value of partnership with public sector and business partner,	No business partners	Need to focus more on long term business relations	Too small to be able to deliver on public procurement regulation		Value of support from municipality, Collaboration for shared services and social clauses in procurement



Limitation – Access to finance

Studies show that most of the social enterprises rely on multiple sources of funding (see e.g., Evers et al 2015). Often state financing is the most important component, but usually there is a degree of (financial) co-responsibility from civil society or the business sector. Funding is often precarious and time-limited, thus preventing long-term market building or R&D activities. Difficulties in accessing finance is compounded by a lack of investment skills and a poor ability to develop adequate business project proposals.

The lack of access to finance is addressed by both Efsi (European Fund for Strategic Investments) and EaSI (EU Program for Employment and Social Innovation). Both offer grants and microfinancing to social enterprises. Recipients of EU funding and guarantees highlight the positive signaling effect this have had on commitment by other investor.^x

Studies of the Swedish WISE reveal that more than half of the incomes steam from the public sector, either through paying for the employees´ wage or buying of service/ products (SAREG 2021). However, public funding tends to be short-term, and municipalities, to circumvent public procurement rules, adhere to project financing which is dependent on the municipalities´ yearly budgeting process (Edvik and Björk 2016).

Most WISE in this study have received project funding from Esf (The European social fund). Despite signaling legitimacy, outcome is limited, where Esf-funding follow the same trajectory as other public project funding mechanism, i.e., time-limited and lasting necessary support for long-lasting employment results (Lindberg, 2021; Lindberg et al., 2022).

Sweden has an infrastructure with advisors and financing for the social economy actors. However, studies and reports picture its limited capacity to enable scaling up (SAREG, 2018, Nachemson-Ekwall, 2021). Coompanion, a public supported corporate development agency with 20 offices around Sweden, and the Microfund Sweden (Mikrofonden Sverige), a social investment fund, are both hampered by a lack of long-term public financing. Customers of Ekobanken, a cooperative social bank, lack access to supportive social credit-guarantees.

All WISE in this study present examples of the distortive effect of lack of access to stable financing. The Way Out!-Cooperatives consist of a network of 20 WISE situated in region Västergötaland. The combined turnover is SEK 40 million, of which 70% emanate from sales (private and public) and 30% from work-training. The network receives a cashflow support credit from Mikrofonden, loans from Ekobanken and project grants from Esf. HR-manager explains the dilemma with a lack of long-term financing:

“The Way Out!-Cooperatives need SEK 5 million. We run a café but lack the capital to invest in a new frying table. We can apply for project grants, but do not receive a structural grant to be able to build up a buffer for investments. If we had known that we would have repeat business from the municipality or the private sector we could have grown.”

HR-manager The Way Out!-Cooperatives



Limitations - labour politics

Generally, there are three establishment public programs for work training for low-skilled language weak migrant women

- (1) *Enhanced work-training* (FAT, Förstärkt arbetsträning). Offered by the SPES it includes simple jobs, like subcontracting work, cleaning, janitorial, coffees. In general, only social enterprises, like WISE and faith communities, and the government sponsored Samhall, are eligible for this service.
- (2) *General work training*, the so called “Support and Matching Service” (STOM) and KROM (Kundval Rusta och Matcha/ Customer-choice - Prepare and Match). Services are regulated through the EU public procurement rules and can last up to 12 months.
- (3) *Job-training as part of rehabilitation*. This program is administrated by the municipality labour-unit. It provides more secure basic funding for social enterprises but also exposes them to short term contracts, individual civil servants as well as risk of being subject to public procurement regulation.

Reports, regulation letters, government notes and academic papers describe the lack of coordination and collaboration between different job-supportive offerings directed to marginalized women (SAERG, 2018). Participants in the establishment program find it difficult to attend activities organized by WISEs, as they might be scheduled for Swedish classes, SFI, at the same time and also at other locations (Kraff & Jernsand, 2021). Writings from the public employment agency include comments such as (SPES 2019: 30), “[i]t can be concluded that the results for foreign-born women are often worse than for other groups..”, (SPES, 2020a: 107), “[t]he prioritization of foreign-born women in 2019 has posed a challenge” and (SPES, 2020b:29), “[p]rioritizing foreign born women (in activities) has not led to more foreign born women employed.”

The FAT-program has been financially ill-suited for WISE that, as explained in interviews often receive 20% lower compensation than Samhall. This has led many WISE, as well as other value-based actors, to opt out from the program. At the same time private sector experience competitions for example with cleaning-offerings. EU commission claims Samhall acting in violation of state-aid rules.^{xi} The Swedish Competition Authority has condemned activities. Samhall has also been discussed in parliament.^{xii}

The second offer involves STOM and KROM. The programs have been revised and developed at a time when SPES has been restructured and downsizing, following decisions from both left and right-centered governments. The programs opened for public procurement, free-choice by the customer and performance-based compensation. Suppliers must meet financial and organizational requirements, have relevant experience, offer supervision and language support/interpreters, be able to receive at least fifty simultaneous participants and act nationally. This automatically excluded many WISE. As stated previously 75% of them employ less than ten people. Few collaborate nationally. Also, performance-based compensation does



not consider that social cooperatives or civil society actors in general lack a capital-buffer. The system thus favors with-profit corporates and large entities. It also entices the suppliers to work with those unemployed that are easy to deliver, leaving out those furthest away from the labour-market.

A study conducted by the Public Employment Research Institute (IFAU, 2021:7) concludes that the KROM search engine did not adequately address that job seekers' job chances decrease the longer they have been unemployed and that low-skilled jobseekers did not manage to register correctly, often due to a lack of language skills or health reasons, thus remaining unattended to. Consequently, at one end many WISE as well as faith institutions have abstained from participating in KROM, and at the other end SPES has applied procurement rules in such a way that it has stopped sending unemployed directly to WISE.

"The Blue Way could do more if we were commissioned. The City of Stockholm has 300-350 job seekers registered but they are not allowed to send them to us, because they must first be matched via KROM, even though the city knows that they are not suitable."

Manager the Blue Way^{xiii}

Representatives from the civil society claim that a lack of assignments on work rehabilitation and work placement to WISE led to many going bankrupt.^{xiv}

"We have lost 20% of the members who were WISE. Half of the Coompanion offices have stopped recommending the start of a WISE. To be able to succeed we require a long-term strategic cooperation with the SPES."

Chair of Coompanion

The third option for WISE is signing collaborative agreements with municipality social service departments. The Yalla Staircase has signed a project-partnership with the municipality of Malmö using the IOP framework (Idéburet Offentligt Partnerskap- Value-driven-Public-Partnership). Yalla Staircase works with a step-wise-program "Yalla's path to work". The offer targets 50-60 women for a six month-period. According to the CEO of Yalla Staircase the participants go on to internships, Swedish language courses (SFI), gets a job at Yalla or in private companies. No one is left behind.

However, the IOPs are few, many municipalities finding that they are too difficult to design and might conflict with public procurement regulation.

Going forward

The role of the public labour agency SPES is again under government-review. In a Ministry of Employment Publication Series (Ds 2021:27) third sector actors, including cooperatives and work integrating social enterprises are, mentioned.



"[t]he added value that idea-based actors bring in the labour market policy activities need to be utilized also in the reformed activities. The Swedish Public Employment Service therefore needs to have as a starting point that there should also be good prerequisites for collaboration with such actors, e.g. non-profit associations, registered faith communities and foundations, cooperative organizations and work-integrating and social enterprises..."

Ds 2021:27:42

In the autumn 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court ruled against the faith communities and allowed reserved contracts for labour integration (using Article 77 for associations focused on work integration) through WISE.

There are also initiatives to build collaborative networks among smaller WISE. The Yalla Staircase comprises of a network of WISE at eight locations around Sweden. The Way Out!-Cooperatives is a network of 12 WISE. It helps WISE submit tenders for public procurements, but also to leverage on the increased interest for social sustainability from the private sector. A HR-manager at Way Out! explains:

"Our next step is to develop our business-offer to companies that want to support us financially, so we can invest to grow and become stable. We sell little to the business community today, but our belief is that the share can increase."

HR-manager Way Out!-Cooperatives

Örebro region collaborates with 15 WISE. There is an action plan on the political agenda. The municipality Nordanstig has meetings with its four WISE in the region, enticing them to collaborate and share resources. Skoopi, representing Swedish WISE, runs the project "ASF Lyfter" with the aim of developing collaborations when bidding for public procurement. All initiatives have received project- funding from Esf. Yet another example is Karlskoga, a municipality with five WISE with a combined turnover of SEK 20 million. These have 50 full-time employees and an additional 150 are enrolled in work-training. Funkis, which employees low-skilled migrant women is today profitable whereas the others are at different phases.

Skoopi has developed a certification system for WISE following a standard set up by the Swedish Institute for Standards, SIS. The standard is expected to work as a template for public-sector procurement with social clauses. The focus is on evaluation of work-progression. There is also work done to develop socioeconomic accounts. All WISE in this study mention a growing interest in social clauses in public procurement.

There are also signs that the business sector is increasing their interest in collaborating with WISE. Examples of this is Trianon, a property-company that owns apartment-blocks in run-down and socioeconomic weak suburbs in the Malmö-region. Trianon has teamed up with Yalla Staircase, offering both a venue for a cafe and cleaning-service for migrant women. The partnership is part of Trianons SDG-goals and included in the company's sustainability bond-



program. Yalla Staircase in Malmö has also signed partnership with the property companies. Yalla also collaborates with the furniture company Ikea and retail-stores H&M.

“It’s a bit ironic. At the same time as the private sector is reaching out and wishes that we support them in their aim to deliver on the social SDGs, the public sector has taken a step back.”

CEO of The Yalla Staircase

5. Analysis and conclusion

In this research we have turned the light on the European challenge of labour integration of low-educated and language weak migrant women. As a societal challenge characterised by multiple and contradictory analysis, the so called “wicked problems” (Nicholls, 2015), migrant women, does not fit into the standardized labour policy programs. This has shown to be especially challenging for welfare states that like Sweden, that holds high faith on social integration primarily achieved through paid work (Erhel et al., 1996).

As a novel instrument, tested across the EU, WISE, are here seen as agents of institutional change. Organized as a hybrid non-traditional business-model, WISE interact with the public and private sector on a new market - the market for work integration of language weak and low-educated migrant women - that either opens or remain closed (North, 1990, Suddaby & Greenwood 2006). A key factor for WISE-success is its capability to be respected as a legitimate partner and constructive collaborations (Suchman, 1995; Suddaby & Greenwood 2005; Paches & Santos 2012).

As shown here the political, cultural, regulatory, and normative context have over the last ten years acted in a contradictory way. WISE and related social enterprises receive support, for example through project funding, offered by municipalities and various EU funds. Other activities have worked in an opposite non-legitimate direction. This includes unpredictable and changing policies for unemployment benefits, procurement rules and a lack of long-term financial support.

From a Swedish perspective, WISE have had limited success challenging the institutional dynamics of Swedish labour politics. WISE have not been recognized for their multifaceted capability for labour market integration, empowerment and fostering of democratic citizens. The hybrid business model that should enable it to draw on resources from both the private and public sector (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2012; Jason, 2013; Nicholls et al., 2015), have been short of a supportive financial infrastructure, present in many other countries (Nachemson-Ekwall 2018, 2021).

Consequently, the role that WISE play as a labour integration provider in a Swedish welfare state differs from both more liberal market economies such as the UK, the US and Canada and in countries with more of a social conservative tradition, such as France, Belgium and Germany (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Sivesind, 2016). In Italy, Spain and UK, WISE can be



described as having reached institutional stability, which is not the case in Sweden (Hedin et al., 2015).

There are signs that a changing and more resilient public labour policy, in post-pandemic times, might free both public and also privately resources to support the future growth of WISE working with low skilled and language weak migrant women. Such a development seems necessary if the Swedish labour market shall cope with the Ukrianian crisis, which will put additional strain on the public labour agency and private suppliers. Such a development will support acceptance of new models to handle complex societal challenges.

Signs of a rebalancing of the Swedish contract is threefold. Firstly, the post-covid-pandemic push for the “S” in the Sustainable Development Goals, highlight the necessity for both the private and public sectors, but also investors, to take a more active role in tackling the socioeconomic gap. Secondly, the forming of organizational maturity within the WISE invites to a professional approach to collaborations and networks, which can strengthen WISE joint offer to both the public and private sector. Last, there is increased societal understanding of the necessity to both value and deploy resources to enable systematic use of impact metrics. This will increase resilience and readiness for cross-sectorial partnerships during the coming period of more socially labelled public procurement rules. The three changes are all necessary ingredients in the work to develop a supportive social financial infrastructure, here framed as the emergence of financial legitimacy.

In sum, a more resilient institutional environment, where changing expectations rebalance the societal contract of the public and private in favor of a clearer focus on the social SDGs, might free resources for experimentation with social enterprises such as WISE going forward. As argued here, this will increase readiness for partnerships between WISE and public and private sector actors if, and when, Sweden develops a supportive social financial infrastructure and public procurement rules.



References

- CHURCHMAN, C. W. (1967): "Guest Editorial: "Wicked Problems"". *Management Science*, 14(4): 141–142.
- DAGENS ARBETE (2021): Så gick det till när Samhall satte vinsten före människorna. Elinor Torp. 12 oktober.
- DEFOURNY, J., HULGÅRD, L. & VICTOR P.: (eds) (2014) *Social Enterprise and the Third Sector: Changing European Landscape in a Comparative Perspective*. London: Routledge.
- DEFOURNY & NYSSSENS: (2008) "Social enterprise in Europe. Recent trends and developments. September". *Social Enterprise Journal* 4(3):202-228
- EBRAHIM, A., BATTILANA J. & MAIR, J. (2014): "The governance of social enterprises: Mission drift and accountability challenges in hybrid organizations." *Research in Organizational Behavior* December (34): 8–100.
- EDVIK, A. & BJÖRK, F. (2016): "Social change through temporary, short-term interventions – the role of legitimacy in organizing social innovations." In Andersen Lundgaard, L, Gawell, M & R Spear (eds) *Social entrepreneurship and social enterprises: Nordic perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- ESPING-ANDERSEN, G. (1990): *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge Polity Press
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2020): Social Enterprises and their ecosystem in Europe. Social Europe. Comparative synthesis report. Executive summary April. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (2014) February 26. *On public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC*. 28.3.2014.
- EU COMMISSION (2017) State Aid SA.38469 (2017/E) – *Sheltered employment in Sweden*. Brussels, 6.12.2017 C 8084 final.
- EVERS, A., EWERT, B. & BRANDSEN, T. (eds) (2014): *Social Innovations for social cohesion. Transnational patterns and approaches from 20 European cities*. Welfare innovations at the local level in favour of cohesion (WILCO) Liege: EMES European Research Network. EU Commission.
- FRED, M. (2018) *Projectification: The Trojan horse of local government*. Phd dissertation, Lunds universitet.
- ALEXIUS, S. & FURUSTEN, S. (Eds.) (2019): *Managing hybrid organizations: governance, professionalism and regulation*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- GAWELL, M. (2019): *Social Enterprises and their ecosystem in Europe*. Country report Sweden. Social Europe. April.



- GAWELL, M. (2016): *Social Entrepreneurship and Social enterprises; Chameleons Through Times and Values*. 41–57. In Lundgaard Andersen, Linda, Gawell, Malin and Roger Spear (eds) (2016) *Social Entrepreneurship and Social Enterprises: Nordic Perspectives*. London: Routledge.
- GAWELL, M. (2018) Arbetsintegration i sociala företag och frivillighetsorganisationer. *Organisation & samhälle*. (1): 50–56.
- GAWELL, M. (2019) Social Enterprises and their ecosystem in Europe. Country Report Sweden. Social Europe.
- HEDIN, U-C., HERLITZ, U., KUOSMANEN, J. & LAURELII, E. (2015): *Arbetsintegrerande Sociala Företag - organisation, ledarskap och delaktighet*. Studentlitteratur. Lund
- IFAU (2021): *Krom – erfarenheter från en ny matchningstjänst med fristående leverantörer inom arbetsmarknadspolitiken* Report. Benmarker, H., Lundin, M., Mörtlund, T., Sibbmark, K., Söderström, M. & Vikström, J.
- JASON, J. T. (2013): “Navigating Paradox as a Mechanism of Change and Innovation in Hybrid Organizations.” February. *Academy of Management Journal* 56(1): 137–159.
- KORPI W. & PALME, J. (2003): “New politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization. Welfare State Regress in 18 countries 1975-1995.” *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 426–46.
- KRAFF, H. & JERN SAND, E. M. (2021): “The roles of social enterprises in a Swedish labour market integration programme – opportunities and challenges for social innovation.” *Social Enterprise Journal* 17(2): 203–219.
- LAURELII, E. (2002) i Hedin, U-C m fl (2015): *Sociala arbetskooperativ* Report Socialstyrelsen, Vinnova, NUTEK Rådet för arbetslivsforskning och Arbetslivsinstitutet.
- LAURELII E., NILSSON L. & HEDIN, U-C. (2014): *Företagen som försvann. En explorativ kartläggning av nedlagda eller ombildade arbetsintegrerande sociala företag 2006–2013*, Temagruppen Entreprenörskap & Företagande. Europeiska Socialfonden.
- LEVANDER, U. (2016): “Narratives of Social Enterprises. Their Constructions and Implications in the Swedish Debate.” In L.L. Anderson et al (2016). Dito.
- LINDBERG, M., HVENMARK, J. & NAHN FELDT, C. (2022): Social Innovation for Work Inclusion – Contributions of Swedish Third Sector Organizations. *Nordic journal of working life studies*, (3).
- LINDBERG, M. (2021): *Social innovation i civilsamhällets organisationer. Kunskapsöversikt och policyrekommendationer*. Report. Entreprenörsskapsforum och Nysta, samarbetsorganisation för civilsamhället: May.
- LINDBERGH, J. (2018) in Bailey, N., Klein hans, R. & Lindbergh, J. (2018): *An assessment of community-based social enterprises in three European countries*. London: Power to Change.



- LUNDGAARD ANDERSEN, L., GAWELL, M. & SPEAR, R. (eds) (2016): *Social Entrepreneurship and Social Enterprises: Nordic Perspectives*. London: Routledge.
- LUNDSTRÖM, T. & WIJKSTRÖM, F. (1997): *The Non-profit sector in Sweden*. Manchester University Press.
- MEDINA M. & BELANGER, C. (2017): "Analyzing external environment factors affecting social enterprise development." *Social Enterprise Journal* 13(1): 38–52.
- MEYER, J W. & ROWAN, B. (1977): Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony *American Journal of Sociology* 83(2): 340–363
- MOLNAR, G. & HAVAS, A. (2019): "Escaping from the poverty trap with social innovation: A social microcredit program in Hungary". In Nicholls and Ziegler (eds)
- NACHEMSON-EKWALL, S (2018): *Ett Sverige är där anställda äger*. Global Utmaning och Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research (SIR). Oktober.
- NACHEMSON-EKWALL, S (2021): *Dags att bry sig. Så kan civilsamhället och den idéburna sektorn lyfta Sverige*. Ekerlids förlag.
- NICHOLLS, A., GABRIEL, M. & SIMON, J. (2015): *New Frontiers in Social Innovation Research*. Nesta. Creativecommons.org
- NILSSON, I. & WADESKOG, A. (2006): *Det sociala företaget och samhället – socioekonomiska bokslut för Basta och VägenUt!*, NUTEK & SEE.
- Nordiska Ministerrådet/Oxford research, 2018.
- NORTH, D. C. (1990): *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press. Online publication: June 2012
- NYSENS, M. (red) (2006): *Social Enterprise. At the crossroads of market, public policies and civil society*. London: Routledge
- OECD (2018) Liebig, T. & R. Tronstad, K. *Triple Disadvantage? A first overview of the integration of refugee women*. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 216
- PACHE, A-C. & SANTOS, F. (2012): "Inside the hybrid organization: selective coupling as a response to competing institutional logics." *Academy of Management Journal* 56: 972–1001.
- PALMÁS, K. (2013): Den misslyckade välfärdsreformen. Sektor 3
- PECK, J. (1996): *Work-place: the social regulation of labour markets*. New York: The Guilford Press
- PESTOFF, V. (2012) "Co-production and Third Sector Social Service in Europe: Some Concepts and Evidence." *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations* 23(4): 1102–1118



- PESTOFF, V. & HULGARD, L. (2016): "Participatory governance in social enterprise." *Voluntas. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 27: 1742–59.
- RANTISI, N. M. & DEBORAH, L. (2021): *In and against the neoliberal state? The precarious siting of work integration social enterprises (WISEs) as counter-movement in Montreal, Quebec.* EPA: *Economy and Space* 53(2): 349–370
- ROSE, N. (1999): *Powers of Freedom.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SCOTT, W. R. (2008): "Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests." Sage Publications
- SEGNESTAM LARSSON, O. (red) (2019): *Upphandlad: forskarperspektiv på offentlig upphandling inom vård och omsorg.* Stockholm: Idealistas.
- SIVESIND, K-H., SEGAARD, S-B. & TRÆTTEBERG, H. (2016): *Towards a new Scandinavian welfare model? Consequences of nonprofit, for-profit and public service provision for active citizenship.*
- SIVESIND, K-H.(eds) Report 2016:1 Publisher: Institutt for samfunnsforskning. Norway
- SJÖGREN, H. (2021) *Idéburen Arbetsmarknad. Ett nytt samhällskontrakt efter pandemin,* Entreprenörskapsforum
- SOCIAL EUROPE (2020): *Social Enterprises and their ecosystem in Europe. Comparative synthesis report. EU Commission 2020.* January. Borzaga, C., Giulia G., Franchini, B., Chiomento, S., Nogales, R & Carini, C.
- SPEAR, R., DEFOURNY, J., FAVREAU, L. & LAVILLE, J. L. (eds) (2001): *Tackling Social exclusion in Europe. The contribution og the social economy.* Routledge. London.
- STATISTICS SWEDEN (2019): "Integration – a description of the situation in Sweden" 21 November.
- STRYJAN, Y. (2004) *Work Integration Social Enterprises in Sweden* Working Papers Series, no. 04/02, Liège: EMES European Research Network.
- STRYJAN, Y. & WIJKSTRÖM, F. (2001) "Co-operative Development Agencies as Means of Bridging Recent Failures of the System", in Spear, R., Defourny, J., Favreau, L., Laville, J.-L. (eds) *Tackling Social Exclusion in Europe.* Ashgate, Aldershot, Burlington USA, Singapore, Sydney: 217–42.
- SUCHMAN, M, C. (1995) "Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches." *Academy of Management Review* 20(3): 571–611.
- SUDDABY, R. & GREENWOOD, R. (2005): "Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy" *Administrative Science Quarterly* 50:35–67.
- SWEDISH AGENCY FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL GROWTH SAERG (2021)
- Tillväxtverket "Statistik om de arbetsintegrerande sociala företagen 2016 – och utvecklingen från 2009".



(2012): Tillväxtverket, *Företag som öppnar dörren till arbetslivet. Arbetsintegrerande sociala företag i Sverige 2012*, 20 april

(2018): *Social inkludering genom ASF skapar tillväxt*. Homepage visited January 4, 2021.

(2018): Brooks, T & Upmann-Helminen. C.

(2018) *Finansieringsvägar för sociala företag*. Avrapportering av Tillväxtverkets deluppdrag 2018-12-10 Dnr Å2018-257

SWEDISH COMPETITIVE AUTHORITY (2020): Misstänkt konkurrensbegränsande offentlig säljverksamhet, städtjänster. Beslut 2021-10-27 Dnr 542/2020.

SWEDISH GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE (2018): *Regeringens strategi för sociala företag – ett hållbart samhälle genom socialt företagande och social innovation*. N2018/00710/FF

SWEDISH GOVERNMENT. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT (2021): *Vissa lagförslag med anledning av en reformerad arbetsmarknadspolitisk verksamhet*. Ds 2021:27

SWEDISH PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE, SPES (2019): *Utrikes födda kvinnor Arbetsförmedlingens återrapportering 2019*. 21 februari

(2020a): Arbetsförmedlingens årsredovisning 2019

(2020b): *Arbetsförmedlingens verksamhetsplan*, Diarienummer: Af-2018/0007 2716

SWEDISH AGENCY FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT. STATSKONTORET (2018): *Sammanställning av kunskap om utomeuropeiskt födda kvinnor som står utanför arbetskraften*. Stockholm: Statskontoret rapport 2018:3. Kontigo AB.

(2020): Utvärdering av folkbildningsinsatser för asylsökande och utrikes födda kvinnor. Stockholm: Statskontoret Report 2020:2.

SWEDISH MUNICIPALITIES AND REGIONS (2020): *Ny väg till innovativa välfärdslösningar. En handbok om samverkan med sociala företag*. SKR och Anders Bro.

VÆKSTHUSET (2019) *Somaliske kvinders fortællinger om arbejde og ledighed Væksthusets Forskningscenter* 1. udgave, 1. oplag 2019.

VAN DER LEYEN, U. (2020): EU President speech at UN on Finance for Development 28 May 2020 <https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/embed/index.html?ref=I-191627&lg=undefined>

¹ In EU 67 per cent of the women participate in the labour force (Eurostat, 2020). Greece (49%) and Italy (53%) reported the lowest rates. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20200306-1>. The gap might be even higher, as many European countries' employment statistics include people in the workforce that cannot earn a living-income, whereas these are categorized as unemployed in Sweden.

² Carl-Axel Andersson, SPES October 21, 2021



³ According to the EU's definition, persons at risk of poverty are those living in a household with a disposable income per consumption unit after taxes below 60 percent of the median value of all those at risk of poverty. In Sweden this amounts to 7 % (Living Condition Survey, SCB 2018).

⁴ Ulrica Persson, chair Skoopi, interview October 12, 2021.

⁵ Esf-projekt Järna lyfter 2012

⁶ Bente Sandström, head of labour unit at Nordanstig, interview December 29 2021

⁷ Nils Varg, head of labour market unit, Karlskoga, interview January 16 2022

⁸ <https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2017/09/satsningar-pa-jobb-och-etablering--alla-som-kan-jobba-ska-jobba/>

⁹ According to Chapter 4. Section 18 of EU public procurement regulation, a contracting authority can take social considerations into account by reserving public contracts for sheltered workshops or suppliers whose primary purpose is social and professional integration.

^x Prof. Dr. Barbara Scheck, European Center for Social Finance. EaSi PPT-presentation Mikrofonden October 2019.

^{xi} https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/270893/270893_1951044_95_4.pdf

^{xii} Konkurrensverket (2021) Misstänkt konkurrensbegränsande offentlig säljverksamhet – städtjänster. 27 oktober. Dnr 542/2020

^{xiii} Erik Lindberg, manager Blå Vägen, October 2021

^{xiv} Open letter to Minister of Labour Eva Nordmark, May 20 2020, Glöm inte dem med störst behov! Funktionsrätt Sverige, Skoopi, KFO (now Fremia)

WEBPAGES

www.skoop.se

www.Sofisam.se